Daily Papers

The 2024 US presidential election is the first major contest to occur in the US since the popularization of large language models (LLMs). Building on lessons from earlier shifts in media (most notably social media's well studied role in targeted messaging and political polarization) this moment raises urgent questions about how LLMs may shape the information ecosystem and influence political discourse. While platforms have announced some election safeguards, how well they work in practice remains unclear. Against this backdrop, we conduct a large-scale, longitudinal study of 12 models, queried using a structured survey with over 12,000 questions on a near-daily cadence from July through November 2024. Our design systematically varies content and format, resulting in a rich dataset that enables analyses of the models' behavior over time (e.g., across model updates), sensitivity to steering, responsiveness to instructions, and election-related knowledge and "beliefs." In the latter half of our work, we perform four analyses of the dataset that (i) study the longitudinal variation of model behavior during election season, (ii) illustrate the sensitivity of election-related responses to demographic steering, (iii) interrogate the models' beliefs about candidates' attributes, and (iv) reveal the models' implicit predictions of the election outcome. To facilitate future evaluations of LLMs in electoral contexts, we detail our methodology, from question generation to the querying pipeline and third-party tooling. We also publicly release our dataset at https://huggingface.co/datasets/sarahcen/llm-election-data-2024

Fine-tuning pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) for specialized tasks incurs substantial computational and data costs. While model merging offers a training-free solution to integrate multiple task-specific models, existing methods suffer from safety-utility conflicts where enhanced general capabilities degrade safety safeguards. We identify two root causes: neuron misidentification due to simplistic parameter magnitude-based selection, and cross-task neuron interference during merging. To address these challenges, we propose LED-Merging, a three-stage framework that Locates task-specific neurons via gradient-based attribution, dynamically Elects critical neurons through multi-model importance fusion, and Disjoints conflicting updates through parameter isolation. Extensive experiments on Llama-3-8B, Mistral-7B, and Llama2-13B demonstrate that LED-Merging effectively reduces harmful response rates, showing a 31.4\% decrease on Llama-3-8B-Instruct on HarmBench, while simultaneously preserving 95\% of utility performance, such as achieving 52.39\% accuracy on GSM8K. LED-Merging resolves safety-utility conflicts and provides a lightweight, training-free paradigm for constructing reliable multi-task LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/MqLeet/LED-Merging{GitHub}.

We propose a new approach to promote safety in classification tasks with established concepts. Our approach -- called a conceptual safeguard -- acts as a verification layer for models that predict a target outcome by first predicting the presence of intermediate concepts. Given this architecture, a safeguard ensures that a model meets a minimal level of accuracy by abstaining from uncertain predictions. In contrast to a standard selective classifier, a safeguard provides an avenue to improve coverage by allowing a human to confirm the presence of uncertain concepts on instances on which it abstains. We develop methods to build safeguards that maximize coverage without compromising safety, namely techniques to propagate the uncertainty in concept predictions and to flag salient concepts for human review. We benchmark our approach on a collection of real-world and synthetic datasets, showing that it can improve performance and coverage in deep learning tasks.

In data poisoning attacks, an adversary tries to change a model's prediction by adding, modifying, or removing samples in the training data. Recently, ensemble-based approaches for obtaining provable defenses against data poisoning have been proposed where predictions are done by taking a majority vote across multiple base models. In this work, we show that merely considering the majority vote in ensemble defenses is wasteful as it does not effectively utilize available information in the logits layers of the base models. Instead, we propose Run-Off Election (ROE), a novel aggregation method based on a two-round election across the base models: In the first round, models vote for their preferred class and then a second, Run-Off election is held between the top two classes in the first round. Based on this approach, we propose DPA+ROE and FA+ROE defense methods based on Deep Partition Aggregation (DPA) and Finite Aggregation (FA) approaches from prior work. We evaluate our methods on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and GTSRB and obtain improvements in certified accuracy by up to 3%-4%. Also, by applying ROE on a boosted version of DPA, we gain improvements around 12%-27% comparing to the current state-of-the-art, establishing a new state-of-the-art in (pointwise) certified robustness against data poisoning. In many cases, our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art, even when using 32 times less computational power.