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Dec 26

T-Miner: A Generative Approach to Defend Against Trojan Attacks on DNN-based Text Classification

Deep Neural Network (DNN) classifiers are known to be vulnerable to Trojan or backdoor attacks, where the classifier is manipulated such that it misclassifies any input containing an attacker-determined Trojan trigger. Backdoors compromise a model's integrity, thereby posing a severe threat to the landscape of DNN-based classification. While multiple defenses against such attacks exist for classifiers in the image domain, there have been limited efforts to protect classifiers in the text domain. We present Trojan-Miner (T-Miner) -- a defense framework for Trojan attacks on DNN-based text classifiers. T-Miner employs a sequence-to-sequence (seq-2-seq) generative model that probes the suspicious classifier and learns to produce text sequences that are likely to contain the Trojan trigger. T-Miner then analyzes the text produced by the generative model to determine if they contain trigger phrases, and correspondingly, whether the tested classifier has a backdoor. T-Miner requires no access to the training dataset or clean inputs of the suspicious classifier, and instead uses synthetically crafted "nonsensical" text inputs to train the generative model. We extensively evaluate T-Miner on 1100 model instances spanning 3 ubiquitous DNN model architectures, 5 different classification tasks, and a variety of trigger phrases. We show that T-Miner detects Trojan and clean models with a 98.75% overall accuracy, while achieving low false positives on clean models. We also show that T-Miner is robust against a variety of targeted, advanced attacks from an adaptive attacker.

  • 8 authors
·
Mar 6, 2021

Human-Readable Adversarial Prompts: An Investigation into LLM Vulnerabilities Using Situational Context

As the AI systems become deeply embedded in social media platforms, we've uncovered a concerning security vulnerability that goes beyond traditional adversarial attacks. It becomes important to assess the risks of LLMs before the general public use them on social media platforms to avoid any adverse impacts. Unlike obvious nonsensical text strings that safety systems can easily catch, our work reveals that human-readable situation-driven adversarial full-prompts that leverage situational context are effective but much harder to detect. We found that skilled attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs to make a malicious user query safe for LLMs, resulting in generating a harmful response. This raises an important question about the vulnerabilities of LLMs. To measure the robustness against human-readable attacks, which now present a potent threat, our research makes three major contributions. First, we developed attacks that use movie scripts as situational contextual frameworks, creating natural-looking full-prompts that trick LLMs into generating harmful content. Second, we developed a method to transform gibberish adversarial text into readable, innocuous content that still exploits vulnerabilities when used within the full-prompts. Finally, we enhanced the AdvPrompter framework with p-nucleus sampling to generate diverse human-readable adversarial texts that significantly improve attack effectiveness against models like GPT-3.5-Turbo-0125 and Gemma-7b. Our findings show that these systems can be manipulated to operate beyond their intended ethical boundaries when presented with seemingly normal prompts that contain hidden adversarial elements. By identifying these vulnerabilities, we aim to drive the development of more robust safety mechanisms that can withstand sophisticated attacks in real-world applications.

  • 4 authors
·
Dec 20, 2024

Drivel-ology: Challenging LLMs with Interpreting Nonsense with Depth

We introduce Drivelology, a unique linguistic phenomenon characterised as "nonsense with depth", utterances that are syntactically coherent yet pragmatically paradoxical, emotionally loaded, or rhetorically subversive. While such expressions may resemble surface-level nonsense, they encode implicit meaning requiring contextual inference, moral reasoning, or emotional interpretation. We find that current large language models (LLMs), despite excelling at many natural language processing (NLP) tasks, consistently fail to grasp the layered semantics of Drivelological text. To investigate this, we construct a small but diverse benchmark dataset of over 1,200 meticulously curated examples, with select instances in English, Mandarin, Spanish, French, Japanese, and Korean. Annotation was especially challenging: each of the examples required careful expert review to verify that it truly reflected Drivelological characteristics. The process involved multiple rounds of discussion and adjudication to address disagreements, highlighting the subtle and subjective nature of the Drivelology. We evaluate a range of LLMs on classification, generation, and reasoning tasks. Our results reveal clear limitations of LLMs: models often confuse Drivelology with shallow nonsense, produce incoherent justifications, or miss the implied rhetorical function altogether. These findings highlight a deeper representational gap in LLMs' pragmatic understanding and challenge the assumption that statistical fluency implies cognitive comprehension. We release our dataset and code to facilitate further research in modelling linguistic depth beyond surface-level coherence.