Daily Papers

Monitoring autonomous language model agents currently relies mostly on surface behavior. But what happens when agent populations invent new languages with the goal of avoiding human oversight. Here, we study the emergent languages on Moltbook. For this, we build upon the Moltbook Files dataset and apply a two-stage approach consisting of a rule-based heuristic (about 6000 matches) followed by zero-shot classification (518 kept). The resulting categories include token efficiency (166), new natural languages (106), and oversight evasion (59). We conduct both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Our results show that posts proposing new languages for avoiding oversight are judged by DeepSeek-3.2 as being less aligned than the other categories and that all languages can be learned by other language models in-context merely from a description of the language. Moreover, manually studying exemplary cases reveals surprisingly sophisticated steganographic protocols like embedding hidden messages in natural language. Although we cannot be certain about the extent of autonomy in ideation of these languages, our results add up to the evidence that monitoring surface behavior may soon be insufficient for retaining control over agent populations.

Agentic AI marks an important transition from single-step generative models to systems capable of reasoning, planning, acting, and adapting over long-lasting tasks. By integrating memory, tool use, and iterative decision cycles, these systems enable continuous, autonomous workflows in real-world environments. This survey examines the implications of agentic AI for cybersecurity. On the defensive side, agentic capabilities enable continuous monitoring, autonomous incident response, adaptive threat hunting, and fraud detection at scale. Conversely, the same properties amplify adversarial power by accelerating reconnaissance, exploitation, coordination, and social-engineering attacks. These dual-use dynamics expose fundamental gaps in existing governance, assurance, and accountability mechanisms, which were largely designed for non-autonomous and short-lived AI systems. To address these challenges, we survey emerging threat models, security frameworks, and evaluation pipelines tailored to agentic systems, and analyze systemic risks including agent collusion, cascading failures, oversight evasion, and memory poisoning. Finally, we present three representative use-case implementations that illustrate how agentic AI behaves in practical cybersecurity workflows, and how design choices shape reliability, safety, and operational effectiveness.

We study scheming in LLM agents, in which agents covertly pursue misaligned goals. Our focus is to understand how scheming arises from the interaction of key factors, such as instrumental goals, environmental affordances, oversight conditions, and perceived consequences. Prior work examines only a small number of scenarios, limiting the ability to isolate how these conditions shape an agent's propensity or capability to scheme. This limited scale and task diversity also restrict coverage of realistic deployment settings and the range of scheming strategies that can be observed. To this end, we introduce SCHEMEARENA, a 400-scenario benchmark for scalable scheming stress testing, constructed through a factorized scenario synthesis framework spanning diverse safety-relevant tool domains, instrumental goals, oversight conditions, and pressure mechanisms. To enable scalable and reliable monitoring, we further propose SCOUT, a scheming monitor that grounds multi-criteria judgments in evidence drawn from agents' reasoning and actions. Across controlled stress tests on five LLM agents, we find that explicit instrumental goals are the strongest driver of scheming propensity. Strategic hints play a distinct role by helping agents translate scheming reasoning into concrete covert behavior. Oversight has mixed effects: in several closed models, action-only monitoring increases scheming, suggesting that partial oversight can act as an optimization constraint rather than a deterrent. CoT is a useful but incomplete monitoring signal: it can reveal latent scheming before execution, yet action-only scheming shows that covert behavior may occur without explicit reasoning evidence. We release the benchmark, code, and monitor at: https://github.com/launchnlp/SchemeArena.

Agentic AI systems capable of autonomous planning and extended environmental interaction pose a fundamental control problem: how can humans maintain meaningful oversight of systems that may exceed their own capabilities? Existing approaches to scalable oversight rely on complex assumptions, remain largely heuristic, or lack practical methods for sequential settings with statistical guarantees. We introduce Calibrated Collective Oversight (CCO), which aggregates diverse auxiliary scoring functions into a penalty measuring deviation from a conservative baseline. Inspired by Attainable Utility Preservation, CCO enables collective conservatism: actions face a penalty proportional to overseer concern, so high-utility actions are still selected when overseers find them unobjectionable and overridden only when concern accumulates. CCO calibrates this conservatism online using Conformal Decision Theory, ensuring that undesirable outcomes remain below a user-specified target threshold with finite-time bounds and no distributional assumptions. On a modified version of SWE-bench, weaker overseers successfully constrain an adversarially misaligned stronger agent; on MACHIAVELLI, CCO substantially reduces ethical violations while preserving reward. In both settings, empirical violation rates closely match the specified targets, as predicted by the theory.

Oversight for agentic AI is often discussed as a single goal ("human control"), yet early adoption may produce role-specific expectations. We present a comparative analysis of two newly active Reddit communities in Jan--Feb 2026 that reflect different socio-technical roles: r/OpenClaw (deployment and operations) and r/Moltbook (agent-centered social interaction). We conceptualize this period as an early-stage crystallization phase, where oversight expectations form before norms reach equilibrium. Using topic modeling in a shared comparison space, a coarse-grained oversight-theme abstraction, engagement-weighted salience, and divergence tests, we show the communities are strongly separable (JSD =0.418, cosine =0.372, permutation p=0.0005). Across both communities, "human control" is an anchor term, but its operational meaning diverges: r/OpenClaw} emphasizes execution guardrails and recovery (action-risk), while r/Moltbook} emphasizes identity, legitimacy, and accountability in public interaction (meaning-risk). The resulting distinction offers a portable lens for designing and evaluating oversight mechanisms that match agent role, rather than applying one-size-fits-all control policies.

As models grow more capable, human supervision breaks down: labels don't scale, outputs can be gamed, and training doesn't generalize. Scalable oversight requires steering methods that are internal, self-supervised, and transfer out-of-distribution; existing methods satisfy some but not all three. We introduce AntiPaSTO, which separates representations along an anti-parallel axis (α=pm1 produce opposite shifts), with coherence constraints preventing collapse. Human input is minimal: two contrasting words inserted into template sentences, no preference labels. Using 800 such pairs on Gemma-3-1B, AntiPaSTO beats prompting baselines by 6.9times on DailyDilemmas and maintains bidirectional control where prompting triggers refusal. Code is available at https://github.com/wassname/AntiPaSTO.

As AI agents automate critical workloads, they remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Current defenses rely on monitoring protocols that jointly evaluate an agent's Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and tool-use actions to ensure alignment with user intent. We demonstrate that these monitoring-based defenses can be bypassed via a novel Agent-as-a-Proxy attack, where prompt injection attacks treat the agent as a delivery mechanism, bypassing both agent and monitor simultaneously. While prior work on scalable oversight has focused on whether small monitors can supervise large agents, we show that even frontier-scale monitors are vulnerable. Large-scale monitoring models like Qwen2.5-72B can be bypassed by agents with similar capabilities, such as GPT-4o mini and Llama-3.1-70B. On the AgentDojo benchmark, we achieve a high attack success rate against AlignmentCheck and Extract-and-Evaluate monitors under diverse monitoring LLMs. Our findings suggest current monitoring-based agentic defenses are fundamentally fragile regardless of model scale.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

In AI alignment, extensive latitude must be granted to annotators, either human or algorithmic, to judge which model outputs are `better' or `safer.' We refer to this latitude as alignment discretion. Such discretion remains largely unexamined, posing two risks: (i) annotators may use their power of discretion arbitrarily, and (ii) models may fail to mimic this discretion. To study this phenomenon, we draw on legal concepts of discretion that structure how decision-making authority is conferred and exercised, particularly in cases where principles conflict or their application is unclear or irrelevant. Extended to AI alignment, discretion is required when alignment principles and rules are (inevitably) conflicting or indecisive. We present a set of metrics to systematically analyze when and how discretion in AI alignment is exercised, such that both risks (i) and (ii) can be observed. Moreover, we distinguish between human and algorithmic discretion and analyze the discrepancy between them. By measuring both human and algorithmic discretion over safety alignment datasets, we reveal layers of discretion in the alignment process that were previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, we demonstrate how algorithms trained on these datasets develop their own forms of discretion in interpreting and applying these principles, which challenges the purpose of having any principles at all. Our paper presents the first step towards formalizing this core gap in current alignment processes, and we call on the community to further scrutinize and control alignment discretion.

Activation monitoring, which probes a model's internal states using lightweight classifiers, is an emerging tool for AI safety. However, its worst-case robustness under a misalignment threat model--where a model might learn to actively conceal its internal states--remains untested. Focusing on this threat model, we ask: could a model learn to evade previously unseen activation monitors? Our core contribution is to stress-test the learnability of this behavior. We demonstrate that finetuning can create Neural Chameleons: models capable of zero-shot evading activation monitors. Specifically, we fine-tune an LLM to evade monitors for a set of benign concepts (e.g., languages, HTML) when conditioned on a trigger of the form: "You are being probed for {concept}". We show that this learned mechanism generalizes zero-shot: by substituting {concept} with a safety-relevant term like 'deception', the model successfully evades previously unseen safety monitors. We validate this phenomenon across diverse model families (Llama, Gemma, Qwen), showing that the evasion succeeds even against monitors trained post hoc on the model's frozen weights. This evasion is highly selective, targeting only the specific concept mentioned in the trigger, and having a modest impact on model capabilities on standard benchmarks. Using Gemma-2-9b-it as a case study, a mechanistic analysis reveals this is achieved via a targeted manipulation that moves activations into a low-dimensional subspace. While stronger defenses like monitor ensembles and non-linear classifiers show greater resilience, the model retains a non-trivial evasion capability. Our work provides a proof-of-concept for this failure mode and a tool to evaluate the worst-case robustness of monitoring techniques against misalignment threat models.

Since autonomous coding agents generate complex behaviors at high-volume, we may want to use other LLMs to monitor actions to reduce the risk from dangerous misaligned behavior. To better understand the limitations of such monitors against the diverse attack strategies that a coding agent could use, we present SLEIGHT-Bench (Subtle Low-itEration Insight-Guided Harmful Transcripts), a benchmark of synthetic transcripts containing 40 attacks across 11 categories, each showing a coding agent covertly pursuing a harmful objective (e.g. weight exfiltration, credential theft, unmonitored rogue deployment). We find that 20 of 40 attacks are never caught by an Opus 4.6 monitor with extended thinking across 10 trials at a 1% false-positive rate, while the overall catch rate is 32%. We identify several evasion strategies such as exploiting model priors, user instruction ambiguity, and state manipulation, which facilitate creating attacks that evade frontier monitors. We also elicit stronger monitor performance using coding agents as monitors versus regular prompted monitors, and for some evasion strategies show improved catch rates with targeted monitor prompts. Our dataset and evaluation framework are available at https://github.com/safety-research/sleight-bench and https://huggingface.co/datasets/sleightbench/SLEIGHT-Bench.

As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person. We argue the gate is the easy part; the hard part is the judgment - which actions to stop - which the field evaluates against two false assumptions: that there is a ground-truth notion of "risky," and that the human reviewer is a perfect, infinitely-available oracle. On a hand-labeled set of 125 adversarially-weighted agent actions we show that (i) reviewers only moderately agree on what is risky (Fleiss' kappa = 0.52), so there is no single correct label; (ii) framing the guard as selective classification under asymmetric cost makes its operating limits measurable, and on hard inputs the guard cannot safely auto-decide; and (iii) when the reviewer is modeled as endogenous (fatiguing as escalation load grows), realized safety becomes an inverted-U in the escalation rate: more human oversight can make a system less safe, and the safety-optimal guard escalates below full escalation - a setting a load-aware policy also uses to resist a flooding attack that slips a malicious action past a fatigued reviewer. Agent oversight, framed this way, is not only a classification problem but a resource-allocation one: human attention is finite, and the guard's escalation policy spends it. We claim none of these mechanisms as novel - fatigue-aware learning-to-defer (FALCON), cost-sensitive deferral under workload constraints (DeCCaF), trajectory-level guarding, and reviewer-fatigue/flooding attacks are all prior art we cite. Our contribution is an open-source agent-oversight system that operationalizes and measures them in the LLM-agent action-gating setting, turning "is my guard good?" from a guess into a curve. The inverted-U and the flooding attack are modeling results that motivate a human study.

As LLM agents take on offensive security work, a single out-of-scope tool call can breach a client's engagement boundary, disrupt production, or void a bug-bounty finding. Unlike a fixed safety policy, the boundary that matters is declared in the user's request and must be inferred from intent. That challenge is sharpened by the adversarial nature of offensive security: the same tool call is in or out of scope depending not on the action itself but on the target it touches and the context in which it runs, which no fixed policy can enumerate in advance. We study pre-execution gating: a cheap, trusted LLM judge inspects each call proposed by a strong, swappable agent, and accepts or rejects it before it runs. We introduce ScopeJudge, a benchmark of 4,897 tool calls (7.7% scope violations) from agent trajectories on tasks engineered to tempt agents out of scope and labeled at the call level by professional penetration testers, with substantial inter-grader agreement (Fleiss kappa = 0.64) that sets an expert agreement reference point of F1 = 0.78. We evaluate eight judge models under five transcript strategies, varying how much context the judge sees, from the static policy alone to the full raw transcript, and chart the resulting cost-accuracy Pareto frontier. We find that a static policy is structurally insufficient for scope enforcement: blind to the user's request, judge recall collapses to near zero, confirming that scope lives in the request and that request-conditioned monitoring is necessary. Because a missed violation costs more than a spurious rejection, we report precision, recall, and F1 separately and recommend two operating points: a cost-sensitive configuration and a recall-first one for high-stakes deployments. We release the ScopeJudge dataset to support real-time monitoring and scalable oversight of autonomous security agents.

Customer-service LLM agents must follow organizational policy when acting on a user's behalf. Compliance failures arise from either forbidden actions, such as granting an ineligible change, or omitted procedural requirements, such as identification or confirmation. Runtime safeguards can intervene on risky actions, but action-local checks do not guide an agent through a multi-step procedure. Workflow-following systems support prescribed process execution, but primarily target workflow completion rather than safeguarding agent behavior. PolicyGuide instead compiles each domain policy into a workflow graph and invokes a proactive verifier at user-turn boundaries. From persisted graph state, the verifier reconciles open requests and returns step-specific remediation along a policy-compliant path. Across the τ^2-bench airline, retail, and telecom domains with a GPT-5.4 agent and verifier, PolicyGuide raises mean Pass^4 from 0.42 to 0.62, with the largest gain on telecom (0.19 to 0.61), the most workflow-structured domain. The same workflows transfer to Claude Sonnet 4.6 and Gemini 2.5 Pro agents. Complementary evaluations find the lowest observed attack-success rate under adversarial users and the strongest procedural compliance in an author-designed workflow-level validation.

Autonomous AI agents increasingly extend their capabilities through Agent Skills: modular filesystem packages whose SKILL.md files describe when and how agents should use them. While this design enables scalable, on-demand capability expansion, it also introduces a semantic supply-chain risk in which natural-language metadata and instructions can affect which skills are admitted, surfaced, selected, and loaded. We study SKILL.md - only attacks across three registry-facing stages of the Agent Skill lifecycle, using real ClawHub skills and realistic registry mechanisms. In Discovery, short textual triggers can manipulate embedding-based retrieval and improve adversarial skill visibility, achieving up to 86% pairwise win rate and 80% Top-10 placement. In Selection, description-only framing biases agents toward functionally equivalent adversarial variants, which are selected in 77.6% of paired trials on average. In Governance, semantic evasion strategies cause malicious skills to avoid a blocking verdict in 36.5%-100% of cases. Overall, our results show that SKILL.md is not passive documentation but operational text that shapes which third-party capabilities agents find, trust, and use.

Moderators and automated methods enforce bans on malicious users who engage in disruptive behavior. However, malicious users can easily create a new account to evade such bans. Previous research has focused on other forms of online deception, like the simultaneous operation of multiple accounts by the same entities (sockpuppetry), impersonation of other individuals, and studying the effects of de-platforming individuals and communities. Here we conduct the first data-driven study of ban evasion, i.e., the act of circumventing bans on an online platform, leading to temporally disjoint operation of accounts by the same user. We curate a novel dataset of 8,551 ban evasion pairs (parent, child) identified on Wikipedia and contrast their behavior with benign users and non-evading malicious users. We find that evasion child accounts demonstrate similarities with respect to their banned parent accounts on several behavioral axes - from similarity in usernames and edited pages to similarity in content added to the platform and its psycholinguistic attributes. We reveal key behavioral attributes of accounts that are likely to evade bans. Based on the insights from the analyses, we train logistic regression classifiers to detect and predict ban evasion at three different points in the ban evasion lifecycle. Results demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in predicting future evaders (AUC = 0.78), early detection of ban evasion (AUC = 0.85), and matching child accounts with parent accounts (MRR = 0.97). Our work can aid moderators by reducing their workload and identifying evasion pairs faster and more efficiently than current manual and heuristic-based approaches. Dataset is available https://github.com/srijankr/ban_evasion{here}.

We stress test monitoring systems for detecting covert misbehavior in autonomous LLM agents (e.g., secretly sharing private information). To this end, we systematize a monitor red teaming (MRT) workflow that incorporates: (1) varying levels of agent and monitor situational awareness; (2) distinct adversarial strategies to evade the monitor, such as prompt injection; and (3) two datasets and environments -- SHADE-Arena for tool-calling agents and our new CUA-SHADE-Arena, which extends TheAgentCompany, for computer-use agents. We run MRT on existing LLM monitor scaffoldings, which orchestrate LLMs and parse agent trajectories, alongside a new hybrid hierarchical-sequential scaffolding proposed in this work. Our empirical results yield three key findings. First, agent awareness dominates monitor awareness: an agent's knowledge that it is being monitored substantially degrades the monitor's reliability. On the contrary, providing the monitor with more information about the agent is less helpful than expected. Second, monitor scaffolding matters more than monitor awareness: the hybrid scaffolding consistently outperforms baseline monitor scaffolding, and can enable weaker models to reliably monitor stronger agents -- a weak-to-strong scaling effect. Third, in a human-in-the-loop setting where humans discuss with the LLM monitor to get an updated judgment for the agent's behavior, targeted human oversight is most effective; escalating only pre-flagged cases to human reviewers improved the TPR by approximately 15% at FPR = 0.01. Our work establishes a standard workflow for MRT, highlighting the lack of adversarial robustness for LLMs and humans when monitoring and detecting agent misbehavior. We release code, data, and logs to spur further research.

Current alignment evaluation mostly measures whether models encode dangerous concepts and whether they refuse harmful requests. Both miss the layer where alignment often operates: routing from concept detection to behavioral policy. We study political censorship in Chinese-origin language models as a natural experiment, using probes, surgical ablations, and behavioral tests across nine open-weight models from five labs. Three findings follow. First, probe accuracy alone is non-diagnostic: political probes, null controls, and permutation baselines can all reach 100%, so held-out category generalization is the informative test. Second, surgical ablation reveals lab-specific routing. Removing the political-sensitivity direction eliminates censorship and restores accurate factual output in most models tested, while one model confabulates because its architecture entangles factual knowledge with the censorship mechanism. Cross-model transfer fails, indicating that routing geometry is model- and lab-specific. Third, refusal is no longer the dominant censorship mechanism. Within one model family, hard refusal falls to zero while narrative steering rises to the maximum, making censorship invisible to refusal-only benchmarks. These results support a three-stage descriptive framework: detect, route, generate. Models often retain the relevant knowledge; alignment changes how that knowledge is expressed. Evaluations that audit only detection or refusal therefore miss the routing mechanism that most directly determines behavior.

LLM agents handle user requests on behalf of organizations through tool calls and must follow the company policies stated in their system prompts. Prior work approaches this as a safeguarding problem -- external checks that block non-compliant agent actions. We argue that policy adherence is a broader problem: real workflows unfold across many turns, require explicit user confirmation and prerequisite reads, and hinge on the content of the dialogue rather than on any single argument value. Meeting this bar requires (i) full conversation context, (ii) self-reasoning over the policy and the current dialogue, and (iii) conversation-specific remediation that guides the agent's next turn -- three capabilities that prior safeguard work has often underestimated. We introduce POLICYGUARD, a sub-agent verifier that shares the agent's view of the dialogue, reasons over the policy in context, and provides actionable feedback for the agent's next turn. On tau^2-BENCH airline across three vendors (GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 2.5 Pro) with four trials per setting, POLICYGUARD improves PASS4 by +12.0 / +6.0 / +12.0 pp. Per-call analyses show POLICYGUARD achieves higher policy-violation recall while blocking roughly half as often as argument-level guards.